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North America's international experiment had not been possible but for the age-long heroisms of Europe that seemed to fail. And our great experiment in civilized internationalism would even yet fail of its full achievement were there in Europe today no heroes ready

to suffer, no million martyrs ready to die, that law shall reign among all the nations, that justice shall come to all the world, and that any people anywhere who desire to be free and are fit to be free shall be given freedom's unfettered chance.

TEN OBJECTIONS TO THE TEN OBJECTIONS

By HAMILTON HOLT

Owing to the widespread comment caused by the editorial "Ten Objections to an International Police," which was published in our August issue, we are reprinting it, with a reply to each objection (printed in italics) by Mr. Hamilton Holt, editor of *The Independent* and a member of the executive committee of the League to Enforce Peace. We are quite content that our readers decide for themselves as to the merits of the issues raised.—THE EDITOR.

1. The plans designed for the creation of a League of Peace, to be backed by an international force, apparently presuppose that such force shall not be used against this country. At least such a contingency has never been discussed.

They presuppose nothing of the kind. If the United States enters a League and agrees to use her force against another nation that breaks the laws of the League, the United States must expect force to be used against her if SHE breaks the laws of the League. If the United States expects to break the rules of the League whenever it is for her interest to do so, and escape punishment, of course she had better keep out of the League. If she keeps her word, she need fear nothing.

2. They ignore the lesson that the decrees of the United States Supreme Court against individual States are executed, notwithstanding the fact that the court has no power of enforcement.

Of course the nine Supreme Court Justices do not shoulder arms to enforce their decisions on the losing litigant. But the whole force of the United States is behind their judgments, and will any one deny that the knowledge of this has made the use of force unnecessary? Ordinarily the decrees of the court of the League will be carried out automatically, as is the case with the Supreme Court, but potential force behind it will strengthen the court a hundredfold.

3. The plans overlook the necessity for first establishing an International Legislature and an International Court, out of which such an international police must develop if it develops at all.

A non sequitur. Almost all Leagues in history are offensive and defensive alliances, which means that the executive departments are paramount. Scarcely any have had judicial or legislative departments. Historically, the executive or department for the use of force comes into existence before courts and legislatures.

4. The supposed necessity for an international police may and probably will be found to be unjustified when once an International Legislature and an International Court are really established.

Would an international legislature and court have prevented the present war? Serbia appealed to The

Hague in vain. It is true that when nations have gone to arbitration they have abided by the award. The difficulty is to get them to go to court. If Austria had known that England, Japan, and Italy would come into the war if she refused arbitration, she would have arbitrated.

5. The efficiency of public opinion, generally granted to be the ultimate executive force behind all law, the executive to which Cicero referred as the "Queen of the World," receives no adequate consideration by the advocates of an international force.

It is true that public opinion is the force behind all forces. But public opinion as a substitute for force is an absurdity. The public opinion of the United States against crime would not apprehend a single criminal or keep him where he could do no harm to society.

6. The present war, indeed all wars, teach that preparedness to use force does not necessarily operate as a deterrent in time of international crises.

True, but the word "necessarily" saves you. The opposite is also true. The preparedness of Japan compels China to acquiesce when Japan sends her an ultimatum. Co-operative preparedness is an entirely different thing from competitive preparedness.

7. Our Federal Constitution provides (Art. I, sec. 8) that the Congress shall "declare war," "raise and support armies," and that the Congress shall have the power to provide for calling forth the militia to repel invasions. The same Constitution further provides (Art. III, sec. 3) that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to our enemies, giving them aid and comfort." Further (Art. IV, sec. 4), "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion." Again (Art. II, sec. 2), "The President of the United States shall have power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, providing two-thirds of the Senators present concur." Before any treaty or series of treaties could be negotiated providing for an international police, transferring the power to declare war to other and possibly hostile nations, it would be necessary to modify all of these articles of our United States Constitution.

This is equivalent to saying that the entrance of the United States into a League is at present unconstitutional. Such authorities on international law as William H. Taft, John Bassett Moore, George Grafton Wilson, Theodore S. Woolsey, et al. do not so hold. Are there any authorities on the other side whose opinions are entitled to greater weight? The same objection can

be made to the United States entering into any treaty in which it agrees to do any specific thing in advance of its happening.

The Senate is a part of the treaty-making power, and has to be consulted in most places where in other countries the executive acts alone. Of course the Senate can refuse to carry out its promises just as the executive can. And it should therefore never make promises that it does not expect to carry out in good faith.

8. The plans assume that the United States Senate can be prevailed upon to accept a scheme which will materially curtail its constitutional prerogatives, subordinate the Congress of the United States to a league unknown to and inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and change both in fact and in theory the form and substance of the Republic of the Fathers.

The Senate is mighty "onery" at times, but when the people apply the lash the Senate always moves.

9. The advocates of an international police as a means of restricting wars do not seem to know, at least they ignore, that, though the proposal is very old, it has never been seriously or popularly received. Without going back to the Greek "Councils," it is a fact that Dante proposed a world federation, backed by force, in his "Convito" early in the fourteenth century. The Grand Design of Henry IV embodied the same principle in 1601. A few years later Hugo Grotius suggested the importance of "certain congresses of Christian powers, in which the controversies among some of them may be decided by others who are not interested, and in which measures may be taken to compel the parties to accept peace upon equitable terms." In 1693 William Penn's plan for the peace of Europe allowed for an international force. Saint Pierre and Rousseau had a similar plan in the early eighteenth century. Lord Liverpool's foreign secretary, Robert Stewart, better known as Viscount Castlereagh, went to the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, for the purpose of establishing an armed

concert of Europe. Cardinal Fleury, Prime Minister to Louis XV of France, when presented with the scheme proposed by Saint Pierre, pleasantly remarked that the document should have a preliminary article providing for the education of missionaries "to dispose the hearts of the Princes of Europe to submit to such a diet." This discriminating suggestion of the Prime Minister suggests today a genuine objection to the plan for an international police.

It is true the suggestions cited for a world federation have never been carried out as proposed; but how about such Leagues of Peace as the Swiss Confederation, the German Confederation, the Commonwealth of Australia, and, most important of all, the United States of America? These all had force behind them to provide against their being broken by enemies, both within and without.

10. We may omit all reference to the Monroe Doctrine and to our ancient policy of avoiding entangling alliances, and simply add that to stress at this time the plan for an international police makes the solution of the problem of war more difficult by complicating it with a factor which is not only unknown, but at this time quite unnecessary.

This is the only argument of the ten worth serious attention. It might offer insuperable obstacles to the United States joining a League of Peace at the present moment if the League agreed to ENFORCE ALL THE DECISIONS of the International Court. But if the League only agreed to use force against the nation that went to war before resorting to a Court or Council of Conciliation, as is proposed in the recently formed League to Enforce Peace, there ought not to be any objection to a nation presenting its case, even the Monroe Doctrine, before such a court or council. See President Lowell's article in the current Atlantic Monthly for a full discussion of this.

PLATFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONGRESS

HELD IN SAN FRANCISCO AND BERKELEY, OCTOBER 10-13, 1915

This platform is printed as it was unanimously approved by the Congress. Dr. David Starr Jordan, President of the Congress, was commissioned by the delegates to take these resolutions in person to the President of the United States, with the special instruction to lay emphasis upon the proposal in Resolution V for a Conference of Neutral Nations. It was also voted that copies of the platform be submitted to the members of Congress, the Cabinet, and the Governors of the States.—THE EDITOR.

THIS Congress gratefully recognizes that to the President of the United States is largely due the fact that this Republic has remained law-abiding, despite currents of fear, hate, and excitement, and that it stands firm on the only basis on which civilization can be restored or peace maintained—the foundation of law.

II. The defense of the Republic is not primarily a matter of armies and navies, but it lies in justice, conciliation, and trust in international law. While we do not urge disarmament under present conditions, we are opposed

to the current widespread demand for costly preparation against hypothetical dangers. If exhausted Europe is an increased menace to America, it must likewise be so to other neutrals, while armament expansion on our part incites similar action in the nations of South America and Asia.

"The hoped-for leadership of America in the achievement of a new-world order would be defeated by her surrender to the belief that the lesson of the great war is that she should seriously enter further into the old-world competition in armament, for, in the words of Washington, 'Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.'"

III. This Congress looks with apprehension on the presence in advisory boards of the United States Govern-